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Title IX, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in
any education programs receiving federal assistance, reaches the
quarter of a century mark on July 1, 1997.1 On November 21,
1996, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that Brown
University was not in compliance with Title IX concerning inter-
collegiate athletics. This landmark decision sends a strong
message to colleges and universities that Title IX must be reck-
oned with in athletic programs, as Brown University is among the
top universities in the country for intercollegiate women's sports.2
A class action lawsuit was filed against Brown University in
1991 for discrimination against women, a violation of Title IX of
* Professor, Department of Legal Studies and International Business, Bowling
Green State University, Chair of the Gender Equity Subcommittee of BGSU's
Intercollegiate Athletics Committee, and a member of BGSU's Intercollegiate
Athletics Gender Equity Planning Team; J.D., University of Toledo College of Law,
Order of the Coif; M.A. & B.A., Bowling Green State University.
1. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq. (1994). See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
July 1, 1972 was the effective date of Title IX. Title IX uses the term "sex" instead of
"gender;" therefore, throughout this article, the term "sex" will be used. See generally
on Title IX in intercollegiate athletics, James Whalen, Gender Equity on Title IX, 5
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POLY, 65 (1996); Victoria Franklin-Sesson, Title IX: Gender
Equity Meets the Sports Pages, 57 ALA. LAW. 98 (1996); Matthew Daniel, Title IX and
Gender Equity in College Athletics: How Honesty Might Avert a Crisis, 1995 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 255 (1995); Janet Judge, D. O'Brien, T. O'Brien, Gender Equity in the
1990's: An Athletic Administrations Survival Guide to Title IX and Gender Equity
Compliance, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 313 (1995), B. Glenn George, Who Pays
and Who Pays: Defining Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 647
(1995); T. Jesse Wilde, Gender Equity in Athletics: Coming of Age in the 90's, 4
MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 217 (1994); Diane Henson and Boyce Cabaniss, It's Not
Whether You Win or Lose But Whether You Get to Play: Title IX Finally Expands
Participation Opportunities for Female Athletics in the 90's, 13 REV. LITIG. 495
(1994); Melody Harris, Hitting 'Em Where It Hurts; Using Title IX Litigation to Bring
Gender Equity to Athletics, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 57 (1994); Walter Connelly, A
University's Defense to a Title IX Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit, 71 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 845 (1994).
2. See infra note 108. Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
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the Educational Amendments of 1972, when Brown reduced two
women's and two men's varsity teams to intercollegiate club
teams. In 1992, the district court held that a preliminary injunc-
tion restoring the women's teams to varsity status was war-
ranted.3 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the
trial judge did not abuse discretion by issuing the injunction.4
Following the trial on the merits in 1995 the district court held
that Brown violated Title IX, and was ordered to submit a plan to
the court for complying with Title IX.5 In November, 1996, the
First Circuit held that Brown violated Title IX, but remanded the
case to the district court so that Brown could submit a further
plan to bring itself into compliance with Title IX.6
This article discusses the history of Title IX concerning inter-
collegiate athletics from its inception until the present, examines
Title IX decisions in intercollegiate athletics leading up to Brown,
analyzes the Brown decision and its ramifications, and concludes
with recommendations on how universities can comply with Title
X's athletic regulatory regime. In an era of budget-cutting, ath-
letic departments, universities, legislatures, conferences, and the
NCAA must work together to find creative solutions to help uni-
versities reach compliance with Title IX concerning intercollegiate
athletics.
TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex under any
educational program or activity receiving federal assistance.7 On
the basis of sex, no person may be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination by any
3. Cohen v. Brown University, 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen I). See
infra notes 95-115 and accompanying text.
4. Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F. 2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen II). See infra
notes 116-125 and accompanying text.
5. Cohen v. Brown University, 879 F.Supp. 185, 214 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen III).
See infra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
6. Cohen v. Brown University, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV). See infra
notes 137-167 and accompanying text.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994), which states in part, "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.. ." Title IX was modeled after Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Diane Heckman, Women and Athletics: A Twenty Year
Retrospective on Title /K, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 9-10 n. 30 (1992).
1997]
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educational institution' receiving federal funds.' In 1972, Title IX
became law when Congress passed and President Nixon signed
the Educational Amendments of 1972.10 Title IX further states
that while educational institutions are not required to grant pref-
erential or disparate treatment to members of one sex due to an
imbalance, consideration may be given to statistical evidence
tending to show an imbalance exists concerning participation or
benefits concerning members of one sex.11
8. 20 U.S.C.§1681(c) (1994) defines educational institutions as "any public or
private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational,
professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an educational institution
composed of more than one school, college, or department which are administratively
separate units, such term means each such school, college, or department."
9. 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g) defines federal financial assistance as any of the
following:
(1) A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds made
available for:
(i) The acquisition, construction, renovation, restoration, or repair of
a building or facility or any portion thereof; and
(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any
entity for payment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity,
or extended directly to such students for payment to that entity.
(2) A grant of Federal real or personal property or any interest therein,
including surplus property, and the proceeds of the sale or transfer of
such property, if the Federal share of the fair market value of the
property is not, upon such sale or transfer, properly accounted for to the
Federal Government.
(3) Provision of the services of Federal personnel.
(4) Sale or lease of Federal property or any interest therein at nominal
consideration, or at consideration reduced for the purpose of assisting the
recipient or in recognition of public interest to be served thereby, or
permission to use Federal property or any interest therein without
consideration.
(5) Any other contract, agreement, or arrangement which has as one of
its purposes the provision of assistance to any education program or
activity, except a contract of insurance or guaranty.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et. seq. (1994). The need for a law like Title IX was
recognized two years earlier when Congress held a hearing on discrimination against
women, included such discrimination in educational settings. Discrimination Against
Women: Hearings on §805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subcommittee on
Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970). Congress adopted Title IX itself as a floor amendment without committee
hearings or reports. This lack of legislative history initially left the scope of the
Statute uncertain. Claudia S. Lewis, Note, Title IX of the 1972 Education
Amendments: Harmonizing Its Restrictive Language With Its Broad Remedial
Purpose, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 1043, 1050-55 (1983).
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994) states:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to
require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate
treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of
that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally
[Vol. 14:152
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Title IX directed federal agencies that extend federal financial
assistance to educational programs or activities to issue rules or
regulations consistent with the objectives of the statute authoriz-
ing financial assistance. 12 These rules and regulations must be
approved by the President, according to Title IX., 3 The Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) formulated regu-
lations pursuant to this mandate in 1975.14 In 1979, Congress
split HEW into the Department of Health and Human Services
supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number of
percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section, or
other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this
chapter of statistical evidence tending to show that such an imbalance
exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any
such program or activity by the members of one sex.
12. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994) states:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way
of grant, loan or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty,
is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 1681 of
this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent
with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial
assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule,
regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by
the President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to
this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or
to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as
to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but
such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political
entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has
been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or
part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by
any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such
action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has
advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with
the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured
by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to
grant or continue, assistance because of failure to comply with a
requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal
department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and
Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity
involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for
such action. No such action shall become effecive until thirty days have
elapsed after the filing of such report.
13. Id.
14. 45 C.F.R. § 86 (1994). HEW received an unprecedented 9,700 comments on
the proposed Title IX athletic regulations. Thomas A. Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics
and Title IX, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 34, 40 (1977). This prompted the HEW Secretary
Casper Weinberger to remark, "I had not realized until the comment period that
athletics is the single most important thing in the United States." Cox at 34.
1997]
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(HHS) and the Department of Education. 15 The Department of
Education replicated HEW's regulations,' 6 and its Office for Civil
Rights ("OCR") currently administers Title IX.
17
The 1975 regulations, as they pertain to intercollegiate ath-
letics, state that no person, on the basis of sex, shall be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefit of, be treated differ-
ently from another person, or otherwise be discriminated against
in any intercollegiate athletics offered by a recipient of federal
funds.'" The regulations further require that if a recipient of fed-
eral funds awards athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid, reason-
able opportunities for the awards for members of each sex must be
granted in proportion to the number of students of each sex partic-
ipating in intercollegiate athletics.' 9 The regulations state that a
recipient of federal funds that operates intercollegiate or other
athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of
both sexes.2" The following factors are to be considered, among
others, in determining whether equal opportunities are available,
according to the regulations:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competi-
tion effectively accommodate the interest and abilities
of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive
facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
21
15. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1994).
16. 34 C.F.R. Part 106 (1994).
17. 20 U.S.C. § 3441 (a)(1) (1994). This section transfers HEW's educational
functions to the Department of Education. 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a) (3) (1994) similarly
transfers education-related OCR functions to the Department of Education.
18. 34 C.F. R. § 106.41(a) (1994). Discrimination in interscholastic, club, or
intramural sports is also prohibited.
19. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c)(1) (1994).
20. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994).
21. Id. This section further states that, "Unequal aggregate expenditures for
members of each sex or unequal expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient
operates or sponsors separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this
section, but the Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary




Mota: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics--The First Circuit Holds B
Published by Institutional Repository, 1997
TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
The regulations further state that athletics shall not be
offered separately on the basis of sex, 22 except separate teams
may be sponsored for members of each sex where selection for
each team is based upon competitive skill or the activity involved
is a contact sport.23 Contact sports include boxing, wrestling,
rugby, ice hockey, football, basketball, and other sports whose
purpose or major activity involves bodily contact. In non-contact
sports, if a team is sponsored for one sex in a particular sport, and
the athletic opportunities for members of the other sex have previ-
ously been limited, then members of the excluded sex must be
allowed to try out for the team.24
In the three years following the issuance of the regulations,
HEW received over one hundred discrimination complaints
involving more than fifty schools.25 A few months before Congress
split HEW in 1979, "emulating King Solomon,"26 HEW published
in the Federal Register a Policy Interpretation of the intercollegi-
ate athletics provisions of Title IX and its implementing regula-
tions .2  The self-stated purposes of the Policy Interpretation were
to clarify the obligations of recipients of federal funds under Title
IX, to provide equal opportunities in athletic programs, and to
provide a means to assess an institution's compliance with the
equal opportunity requirements. 2' Although there appears to be
no record that the Department of Education formally adopted the
Policy Interpretation, 29 and the Policy Interpretation has not been
approved by either the President or Congress and thus does not
have the full effect of a regulation promulgated under Title IX;30
nonetheless, courts have given substantial deference to the Policy
Interpretation. 31
The Policy Interpretation is divided into three sections: ath-
letic scholarship; other program areas; and effective accommoda-
22. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (1994).
23. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (1994).
24. Id. The issue of contact sports was raised in Williams v. School District of
Bethlehem, Pa., 998 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 1993), where a boy wanted to try out for girl's
field hockey when the school only had girl's field hockey. The issue of whether field
hockey involved bodily contact was a fact issue that precluded summary judgment.
25. Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 896 (1st Cir. 1993), (Cohen II).
26. Id.
27. 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 413-23 (1979).
28. 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 415 (1979).
29. Cohen II at 896.
30. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994). See supra note 12.
31. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n., 499 U.S. 144,
150 (1991); Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888, 895 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen II);
Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824, 828 (10th Cir. 1993).
19971
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tion of student interests and abilities. The second section, other
program areas, is further broken down into eleven areas, for a
total of thirteen program components to be assessed for compli-
ance. These eleven program areas are:
1. Equipment and Supplies
2. Scheduling of Games and Practice Time
3. Travel and Per Diem Allowance
4. Tutors
5. Coaches
6. Locker Rooms, Practice and Competitive Facilities
7. Medical and Training Facilities and Services
8. Housing and Dining Facilities and Services
9. Publicity
10. Support Services
11. Recruitment of Student Athletes32
The Policy Interpretation added the last two program compo-
nents, which were not in the regulations.
Concerning the first area-athletic financial assistance-the
Policy Interpretation states that compliance will be primarily
determined by comparing the amount of financial assistance
which is available to men's and women's athletic programs.
3
Compliance is achieved if the comparison shows that substantially
equal amounts of financial aid are available to both groups,34 or if
a resulting disparity can be explained by adjustments to take into
account legitimate, nondiscriminatory factors. 5
32. 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 417 (1979). The program areas varied slightly from the
1975 regulations as OCR determined that the analysis of coaching was simplified by
combining the opportunity to receive coaching and the assignment and compensation
of coaches. Similarly, the opportunity to receive tutoring and the assignment and
compensation of tutors was combined.
33. Id. Compliance is determined by dividing the amounts of aid available for
members of each sex by the numbers of male or female participants in the program
and comparing the results.
34. The 1990 TITLE IX INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL requires a "Z" test and a
"T" test to determine whether any differences in aid are statistically significant. OCR,
TITLE IX INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL 17 (1990).
35. The Policy Interpretation notes two possible nondiscriminatory factors
which may explain differences in athletic financial assistance:
The higher costs of tuition for students from out-of-state may in some
years be unevenly distributed between men's and women's program.
These differences will be considered nondiscriminatory if they are not the
result of policies or practices which disproportionately limit the
availability of out-of-state scholarships to either men or women.
An institution may make reasonable professional decisions concerning
the awards most appropriate for program development. For example,
team development initially may require spreading scholarships over as
[Vol. 14:152
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The second program component in the regulations36 and the
Policy Interpretation is the effective accommodation of student
interests and abilities. The basic determination of this program
component relies on a two-part analysis: equal opportunities to
compete and levels of competition. The Policy Interpretation sets
forth a three-prong test, only one prong of which must be complied
with, for assessing equal opportunities to compete:
1. Whether intercollegiate [or interscholastic] level partici-
pation opportunities37 for male and female students are
provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their
respective enrollments; or
2. Where the members of one sex have been and are under-
represented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the
institution can show a history and continuing practice of
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to
the developing interests and abilities of that sex; or
3. Where the members of one sex are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot
show a continuing practice of program expansion such as
that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of members of that sex have been
fully and effectively accommodated by the present
program.38
In assessing the levels of competition, the Policy Interpretation
sets forth a two-prong test, only one prong of which must be met:
1. Whether the competitive schedules for men's and
women's teams, on a program-wide basis, afford propor-
tionately similar numbers of male and female athletes
equivalently advanced competitive opportunities; or
much as a full generation (four years) of student athletes. This may
result in the award of fewer scholarships in the first few years than would
be necessary to create proportionality between male and female athletes.
See supra note 27.
36. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (1994). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
37. The Policy Interpretation defines participants as those athletes:
a. Who are receiving the institutionally-sponsored support normally
provided to athletes competing at the institution involved, e.g.,
coaching, equipment, medical and training room services, on a regular
basis during a sport's season; and
b. Who are participating in organized practice sessions and other team
meetings and activities on a regular basis during a sport's season; and
c. Who are listed on the eligibility or squad lists maintained for each
sport, or
d. Who, because of injury, cannot meet a, b, or c above but continue to
receive financial aid on the basis of athletic ability.
38. 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 417 (1979).
1997]
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2. Whether the institution can demonstrate a history and
continuing practice of upgrading the competitive opportu-
nities available to the historically disadvantaged sex as
warranted by developing abilities among the athletes of
that sex.39
For each of the eleven program components, the benefits for
men are compared with the benefits for women. The benefits must
be equivalent.40 If there are any differences in benefits which can-
not be explained by nondiscriminatory factors,41 resulting in a dis-
parate impact on one sex, then compliance is not achieved in that
program component.
The Policy Interpretation discusses what must be equivalent
to achieve compliance in each of the program components. The
Policy Interpretation states that equipment and supplies include
uniforms and other apparel; sports specific equipment and sup-
plies, instructional devices, and weight training equipment.
These equipment and supplies are to be assessed in the areas of
quality, amount, suitability, maintenance, replacement, and avail-
ability. The Policy Interpretation states that compliance in the
scheduling of games and practice time is determined by assessing
the following: number of competitive events per sport; number
and length of practice opportunities; time of day competitive
39. 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 418 (1979) The Policy Interpretation states that, "[iln the
selection of sports, the regulation does not require institutions to integrate their
teams nor to provide exactly the same choice of sports to men and women." Id., at 417-
18. Since the regulations at 34 C.F.R. §106.41(b) (1994), see supra note 24 and
accompanying text, differentiate between contact and non-contact sports, the Policy
Interpretation states that where an institution offers a team in a contact sport for
members of one sex, it must offer a team for members of the other sex when: (1)
opportunities for members of the excluded sex have historically been limited, and (2)
there is sufficient interest and ability to sustain a viable team and a reasonable
expectation of intercollegiate competition. For non-contact sports, where a team is
offered to students of one sex, a team must be offered to members of the excluded sex
where: (1) opportunities for members of the excluded sex have historically been
limited; (2) there is sufficient interest and ability to sustain a viable team and
reasonable expectation of intercollegiate competition for that team; and (3) members
of the excluded sex do not possess sufficient skill to be selected for a single integrated
team or compete actively on such a team if selected.
40. 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 421 (1979).
41. Nondiscriminatory factors may include, according to the Policy
Interpretation, disparities in recruitment to annual fluctuations in team needs;
disparities in management costs for sports that draw large crowds; and, disparities in
coaching salaries when a coach has an outstanding record of achievement to justify a
high salary. Other nondiscriminatory factors include: rules of play; nature/
replacement of equipment; rates of injury, and nature of facilities including upkeep
requirements. The Policy Interpretation states, "[flor the most part, differences
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events are scheduled; time of day practice opportunities are sched-
uled; and opportunities to engage in available pre- and post- sea-
son competition. Compliance is determined in travel and per diem
allowance by considering modes of transportation, housing fur-
nished during travel, length of stay before and after competitive
events, per diem allowances, and dining arrangements.
The Policy Interpretation requires that the availability of
tutoring and the procedures and criteria for obtaining tutorial
assistance be assessed to determine compliance for the opportu-
nity to receive said tutoring. In determining compliance for the
assignment of tutors, tutor qualifications, training, and experi-
ence are assessed.4 2
In the program component of opportunity to receive coaching
assignment and compensation of coaches, the Policy Interpreta-
tion examines three areas to determine compliance: opportunity
to receive coaching; assignment of coaches; and compensation of
coaches.43 The following factors are to be assessed in determining
compliance in locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities
according to the Policy Interpretation: quality and availability of
the facilities provided for practice and competitive events; exclu-
sivity of the use of facilities provided for practice and competitive
events; availability and quality of locker rooms; maintenance of
practice and competitive facilities; and preparation of facilities for
practice and competitive events.44
The Policy Interpretation lists five factors to be assessed in
determining compliance with provisions of medical and training
facilities and services: availability of medical personnel and
assistance; health, accident and injury insurance coverage; availa-
bility and quality of weight training and conditioning facilities;
and availability and qualification of athletic trainers. 45 Two fac-
42. Id. The following factors are to be assessed in determining compliance for
the compensation of tutors: hourly rate of pay by nature of subjects tutored; pupil
load per tutor; tutor qualifications; experience; and other terms and conditions of
employment.
43. 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 413 et. seq. (1979). The following three factors are assessed
in determining compliance for the opportunity to receive coaching: relative
availability of full time coaches, part-time and assistant coaches, and graduate
assistants. In assignment of coaches, the training, experience and other professional
qualifications, as well as professional standing, are to be assessed. The following are
assessed to determine compliance for the compensation of coaches: the rate of
compensation; the duration of contracts; the conditions relating to contract renewal;
experience; the nature of coaching duties performed; working conditions; and other
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tors are to be assessed, according to the Policy Interpretation, in
determining compliance for the provision of housing and dining
facilities and services: the housing provided and other special
services such as laundry facilities, parking, space, or maid
46service.
In the area of publicity, the availability and quality of sports
information personnel, the access to other publicity resources; and
the quantity and quality of publications and other promotional
devices are to be assessed. The Policy Interpretation states that
in the area of providing support services, the administrative and
clerical support provided to an athletic program can affect the
overall provision of opportunity to male and female athletes, as
the provided services may enable coaches to perform their coach-
ing functions better.47 The amount of administrative, secretarial
and clerical assistance provided to men's and women's programs
are to be assessed to determine compliance. Finally, according to
the Policy Interpretation, the following are to be assessed in deter-
mining compliance in the area of recruitment: whether coaches or
others are provided substantially equal opportunities to recruit;
whether resources, financial or other, available for recruitment
are equally adequate; and whether the differences in benefits,
opportunities, and treatment in recruiting student athletes have a
disproportionately limiting effect on either sex.48
The Supreme Court in 1984 in Grove City College v. Bell nar-
rowly interpreted the "program or activity" language in the Title
IX statute.49 The Court held that the "assumption that Title IX
applies to programs receiving a larger share of a school's own lim-
ited resources as a result of federal assistance earmarked for use
elsewhere within the institution is inconsistent with the program-
specific nature of the statute."5 ° This narrow reading of Title IX
placed virtually all athletic departments out of Title IX's reach.
In an effort to overturn the Grove City decision, Congress




49. 465 U.S. 555, 573 (1984). In Grove City, however, the Court did hold that
federal student aid granted to Grove City College students did subject the college's
entire financial aid office to Title IX.
50. Id. at 572. See Paula M. Carey, Comment, Grove City College v. Bell: The
Weakening of Title IX, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805 (1985).
51. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). See S. Rep. No. 64, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1988) (stating that Congress wanted to prohibit discrimination throughout an
institution if the institution received any federal funds). See generally P. Michael
[Vol. 14:152
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restored broad, institution-wide application to four civil rights
acts," including Title IX, which now states in part that the terms
"program or activity" or "program" encompass all of the operations
of a college or university, other postsecondary institution, or a
public system of higher education.
53
In 1995, the OCR circulated over 4,500 copies of a draft of the
proposed Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Gui-
dance: The Three-Part Test (hereinafter "Clarification"). 4 The
OCR states that this Clarification does not change the standards
for the effective accommodation of interests and abilities as set out
in the Policy Interpretation. About half the comments were a ver-
sion of a form letter urging OCR to enforce Title IX strongly. Most
of these were from athletes and others at the University of Texas
at Austin.55 Instead it provides further information on assessing
compliance under the three-prong test. This Clarification con-
firmed that institutions need only comply with one prong of the
three-prong test.
The first prong examines whether participation opportunities
for male and female students in intercollegiate athletics are sub-
stantially proportionate to their full-time undergraduate enroll-
ments. According to the Clarification, cutting or capping men's
teams is one way to comply with this first prong, the so-called
"safe harbor," but not the second or third.56
Villalobos, The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987: Revitalization of Title IX, 1
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 149 (1990).
52. Pub. L. No. 100-259, §2, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). The other acts are the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, and Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.
53. 20 U.S.C. §1687(2)(A) (1994).
54. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVL RIGHTS,
CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS POLICY GUIDANCE:
THE THREE-PART TEST (1995) (hereinafter "OCR CLARIFICATION"). The
clarification emerged from a House of Representatives hearing in May, 1995, that
focused on complaints that the OCR unfairly applies the three-part test. In 1990, the
OCR also published a Title IX Athletics Investigators Manual, which superseded two
prior guidance documents issued by the OCR in 1980 and 1982. The manual states
that separate investigations may be conducted for the three policy components. OCR,
TITLE IX INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL 7 (1990).
55. OCR CLARIFICATION at 1.
56. Id. at 4. The Clarification gives examples of compliance and non-compliance
with this prong. Assume two institutions with 52% of the student body being female,
but only 47% of the student athletes being female. At an institution with 60 student
athlete participants, 28 would be women and 32 would be men. The 5% differential
would be made up, assuming no men were dropped, by adding six female participants.
Women would then make up 34 of the 66 participants, or nearly 52%. Since six
participants are unlikely to support a viable team, this institution would be in
compliance. At an institution with 60 athletes, however, approximately 62 women
19971
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The second prong requires a history57 and continuing prac-
tice58 of program expansion for the underrepresented sex.59 The
Clarification states that the OCR will review the entire history of
an athletic program, and will first assess whether the past actions
of the institution have expanded participation opportunities for
the underrepresented sex in a manner that was demonstrably
responsive to their developing interests and abilities. Even
though some participation opportunities for the underrepresented
sex have been eliminated, the institution may still comply with
the second prong if, overall, it has a history and continuing prac-
tice of program expansion for the underrepresented sex.6 °
Finally, the third prong requires that an institution fully and
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of the under-
represented sex at the institution. Pursuant to the Clarification,
this prong may be met even if there are disproportionally high
athletic participation rates by the overrepresented sex, so long as
the imbalance does not reflect discrimination. To make this deter-
mination, the OCR will consider the following: unmet interest in
a particular sport;61 sufficient ability to sustain a team in the
would need to be added and since a viable sport could be added, this second
institution would not be in compliance with a 5% differential. Id. at 5.
57. Factors that may indicate a history of program expansion include: an
institution's record of adding intercollegiate teams, or upgrading teams to
intercollegiate status, for the underrepresented sex; an institution's record of
increasing the numbers of participants in intercollegiate athletics who are members
of the underrepresented sex; and an institution's affirmative responses to requests by
students or others for addition or elevation of sports. OCR CLARIFICATION at 6.
58. Factors indicative of a continuing practice of program expansion include: an
institution's current implementation of a nondiscriminatory policy or procedure for
requesting the addition of sports (including the elevation of club or intramural teams)
and the effective communication of the policy or procedure to students; and an
institution's current implementation of a plan of program expansion that is
responsive to developing interests and abilities. OCR CLARIFICATION at 6.
59. Id. at 6. An institution's efforts to monitor developing interests and abilities,
and to take timely action in response to the results, would be persuasive evidence to
the OCR. Id. at 6-7.
60. Id. at 7. The Clarification gives an example of an institution in compliance.
This hypothetical institution established seven women's teams in the 1970s. It added
another in the 1980s at the request of students and coaches. It upgraded a women's
club sport to varsity in 1990 by request, and is adding a women's team in 1996 that is
an emerging women's team in the region. A hypothetical non-complying institution
also established seven women's teams in the 1970s and added the two teams similarly
in the 1980s and early 1990s. But, a women's team was dropped in 1993, and nothing
has been done responsive to the underrepresented six since. Id. at 7-8.
61. The Clarification states that the following factors will be examined to
determine unmet interest by the underrepresented sex: requests by students and
admitted students that a particular sport be added; requests that an existing club
sport be elevated to intercollegiate team status; participation in particular club or
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sport;62 and a reasonable expectation of competition for the
team.63
After reviewing Title IX, its enforcing regulations, the Policy
Interpretation, and the Clarification, the circuit courts of appeals'
decisions applying Title IX to intercollegiate athletics leading up
to Cohen v. Brown University will be reviewed.
CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS ON TITLE IX IN INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS BEFORE COHEN V. BROWN UNIVERSITY
Since May 1993, every circuit court decision leading up to
Cohen v. Brown University on a Title IX claim of discrimination in
athletics is in accord with the explication of the Title IX regime as
it applies to athletics. 4 It should be noted, however, that the
intramural sports; interviews with students, admitted students, coaches,
administrators and others regarding interests in particular sports; results of
questionnaires of students and admitted students regarding interests in particular
sports; and participation in particular interscholastic sports by admitted students.
This assessment may involve straightforward and inexpensive techniques, such as
student questionnaires or an open forum. OCR CLARIFICATION at 10. OCR will
also look at participation rates in sports in high schools, amateur athletic
associations, and community sports leagues.
62. According to the Clarification, indications of ability include:
"the athletic experience and accomplishments-in interscholastic, club or
intramural competition-of students and admitted students interested in
playing the sports;
opinions of coaches, administrators, and athletes at the institution
regarding whether interested students and admitted students have the
potential to sustain a varsity team; and
if the team has previously competed at the club or intramural level,
whether the competitive experience of the team indicates that it has the
potential to sustain an intercollegiate team.
Neither a poor competitive record nor the inability of interested students
or admitted students to play at the same level of competition engaged in
by institution's other athletes; however, is conclusive evidence of lack of
ability." Id. at 11.
63. OCR examines the following in the geographic area that the institution's
athletes primarily compete: competitive opportunities offered by other schools
against which the institution competes; and competitive opportunities offered by
other schools in the institution's geographic area, including those offered by schools
against which the institution does not now compete. Id. at 11-12.
64. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV), citing Homer
v. Kentucky High School Athletics Ass'n., 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelley v. Bd. of
Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995); Favia v.
Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of
Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993). The date is
not arbitrary; the date is from the First Circuit's prior decision in Cohen II. In a Title
IX decision not involving intercollegiate athletics, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit in April, 1993 held that a female college professor did not establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact sexual discrimination. Chance v. Rice Univ., 989 F. 2d
1997]
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Cook v. Colgate Univer-
sity, vacated a Title IX decision as moot in favor of female stu-
dents in April 1993, as the students bringing action had
graduated.6" Colgate had a male varsity ice hockey team and a
female club hockey team. Members of the women's club ice hockey
team followed Colgate's procedure to petition to upgrade a club
team to varsity status. Refused four times, the members filed suit
under Title IX.66 The district court ordered Colgate to upgrade
the women's team and to provide equal athletic opportunities to
the women ice hockey players.67 The Second Circuit, however,
vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, because the
ice hockey season ended and the last of the plaintiffs were gradu-
ating.68 To avoid dismissal for mootness, plaintiffs should bring a
class action 69 or sue in a representative capacity, as the plaintiffs
179, 180 (5th Cir. 1993); 984 F.2d 151 (15th Cir. 1993). Chance alleged that the
district court did not apply the proper standard, but the First Circuit stated that
under either standard, Chance would not prevail as there was no showing of
statistically significant salary differentials.
65. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
66. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 741 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). Claims of
violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were also raised, but the district
court stated that Title IX can be violated without showing a specific intent to
discriminate, but Fourteenth Amendment gender discrimination actions require
intentional acts to be shown. The Supreme Court has stated that compensatory
damages may be awarded in a Title IX action where intentional discrimination is
established. Franklin v. Gwinnett Co. Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992). This non-
athletics case involved a female student attending a public high school alleging sexual
harassment. See, Jennifer Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A
Commitment to Fairness, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 133 (1995).
67. Id. at 751. In reaching this decision, the district court stated that "[e]qual
athletic treatment is not a luxury," and is "little enough to expect of a fine university."
The court did not dictate what Colgate had to do to make the two teams equivalent,
but encouraged Colgate to look at what other schools, such as Howard and Wesleyan,
had done. The district court stated that many of Colgate's reasons for not elevating
the women's teams, such as it is not played regularly on the secondary level and the
NCAA does not sponsor a championship, and there is a lack of student interest and
ability, are a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 749. While hockey is inexpensive, in
1990-91, Colgate spent about $655,000 on men's varsity sports and about $219,000 on
women's, or 25% of the budget. Id. at 742. Further, Colgate University gave men's ice
hockey fifty times the financial support that women's ice hockey received. Id. at 744.
The district court stated that "[tihe men's (sic) ice hockey players at Colgate are
treated as princes. The women's ice hockey players are treated as chimney sweeps."
Id. at 745.
68. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993). The court stated that
these plaintiffs may not litigate the claims of students unnamed and
underrepresented in this action.
69. In a class action, however, an order specifically requiring an institution to
maintain a team may go further than necessary to correct a Title IX violation. In a
class action, the more appropriate remedy might be to enjoin men's competition until
a compliance plan is presented. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture, 998
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in Cohen v. Brown University did when they brought suit on
behalf of "all present and future Brown University women stu-
dents and potential students who participate and/or are deterred
from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown."70
In July 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that Colorado State University ("CSU") violated Title IX, when it
discontinued women's varsity fast pitch softball, in Roberts v. Col-
orado State Board of Agriculture.71 The plaintiffs, CSU students
and former members of the varsity fast pitch softball team, sued
when the team was discontinued. The district issued a permanent
injunction reinstating the team.72
The Tenth Circuit stated that the ultimate burden lies with
the plaintiffs to show that they have been excluded from participa-
tion in, or denied benefits of, an athletic program on the basis of
sex, under Title X. The circuit court stated that an institution
may violate Title IX's regulations by failing to effectively accom-
modate the interests and abilities of student athletes. 74 The court
then analyzed the Policy Interpretation's three-prong test and
concluded that none of the prongs were satisfied.75 Therefore, the
permanent injunction reinstating the program was upheld.76
F.2d 824, 833 (10th Cir. 1993). See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. But see,
Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993), notes 73-79, and
accompanying text.
70. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F. 2d 888, 893 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen II). This
case also was certified as a class action.
71. 998 F.2d 824 (loth Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993). Colorado
State University was the defendant, but not a party to the appeal. Colorado State
Board of Agriculture, charged with the general control and supervision of Colorado
State University, is in financial control of CSU and is apparently the only entity
capable of being sued under state law. Id. at 826, note 1.
72. 814 F.Supp. 1507. (date?)
73. 998 F.2d at 831 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)). See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
74. Id. at 828 (citing 34 C.F.R. section 106.41(c)). See supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
75. 998 F. 2d at 829, citing 44 Fed. Reg. 71, 418. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text. The defendant could not take shelter in the safe harbor of
substantial proportionality as the disparity between enrollment and athletic
participation for women was 10.5%. The second prong, a history and continuing
practice of expansion in women's athletics was not met, as three women's sports had
been dropped and women's participation opportunities had dropped 34% in the last 12
years. Id. at 830. The heart of the controversy is the meaning of the third prong, full
and effective accommodation of interests and abilities, but this was not met, either.
Id. at 831-32.
76. 998 F.2d 824. The team does not need to be sustained indefinitely; however,
(citing Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993) and United States v. Swift &
Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932)), see supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text, when all
the plaintiffs have transferred or graduated, the defendant could return to court to
1997]
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In October 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
upheld a preliminary injunction requiring the reinstatement of
women's varsity field hockey and gymnastics in Favia v. Indiana
University of Pennsylvania.7" When IUP announced plans to dis-
continue four varsity athletic programs-two men's and two
women's-a class action lawsuit was brought on behalf of women
athletic program participants and all present and future IUP
women students or potential students who participate, seek to
participate, or are deterred from participating in intercollegiate
athletics.7 8 The plaintiffs claimed that the planned elimination of
the women's teams violated Title IX. The district court held that
none of the Policy Interpretation's three prongs was fulfilled, and
"a cash crunch is no excuse."79 A preliminary injunction was
granted. IUP sought a modification to allow women's soccer to
replace gymnastics, but the district court denied this change.8 "
In 1990-91, 56% of the IUP student population was female,
while 38% of the student athletes were female. After the program
cutbacks, 37% of the student athletes were female. Twenty-one
percent of athletic scholarships were awarded to women, and for
each $8.00 spent on men's athletics, $2.75 was spent on women.
According to the district court, "[tihe statistics speak for them-
selves and make a strong case for the women plaintiffs."
8 1 IUP
argued that if it were allowed to add women's soccer, which fields
a larger team than gymnastics, women's participation numbers
would increase. Nevertheless, according to the Third Circuit,
since soccer is a less expensive sport, the funding gap would actu-
ally increase and IUP still would not be in compliance.8 2 As the
district court stated, "[ylou can't replace programs with
promises."8 8 Thus, the injunction was upheld.
have the injunction dissolved. Or, if the Title IX violation was remedied, then the
defendant would no longer have to maintain its softball program. Id. at 834.
The Tenth Circuit also held that the district court exceeded its authority in
mandating a fall exhibition season. Id. at 835.
77. 7 F.3d 332, 333 (3d Cir. 1993).
78. 812 F. Supp. 578, 579 (W.D. Pa. 1993). The cut backs in the men's teams
saved $35,000, while cutbacks in the women's teams saved $110,000. Id.
79. Id. at 583-585.
80. Id. at 585.
81. Id. at 581. In addition, five males had paid memberships to a local county
club, and several male coaches had courtesy cars. A drawing for a scholarship was
conducted at halftime of the men's basketball game. Id.
82. 7 F. 3d at 343. Adding the proposed soccer team would raise women's
participation to 43%, which is still not in compliance. Id.
83. 812 F.Supp. at 585.
[Vol. 14:152
17
Mota: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics--The First Circuit Holds B
Published by Institutional Repository, 1997
TITLE IX AND INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided in 1994
that the University of Illinois's decision to terminate the men's
swimming program, while retaining the women's swimming pro-
gram, did not violate Title IX, in Kelley v. Board of Trustees. 4 In
1993, the university cut four varsity athletic program's, men's
swimming, men's fencing, and men's and women's diving. In
1982, the Office for Civil Rights had determined that the Univer-
sity of Illinois was not in compliance with Title IX concerning
female student athletes' opportunities, and the university repre-
sented that it would remedy the disparity within a reasonable
time. A decade later, however, women comprised 44% of the stu-
dent body but 23% of intercollegiate athletes. Therefore, accord-
ing to the Seventh Circuit, the decision to cut the men's swimming
team while retaining the women's team was a reasonable
response to the regulation and the Policy Interpretation.85
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1994 reversed a
summary judgment in the defendant's favor when female high
school student athletes sued the Kentucky State Board of Educa-
tion and the Kentucky High School Athletic Association (KHSAA)
alleging discrimination under Title IX.8 6 The KHSAA sanctioned
18 sports, 10 for boys and 8 for girls; boys' baseball and girls' slow
pitch softball were both sanctioned. Plaintiffs filed suit, claiming
that fewer sanctioned sports deny equal athletic opportunities,
and that refusing to sanction girls' fast pitch softball disadvan-
tages their ability to compete for college scholarships, as only fast
pitch, not slow pitch, is sanctioned by the NCAA. The Sixth Cir-
cuit held that under Title IX, the regulations, and the Policy Inter-
pretation, there is a genuine issue of whether the defendants were
in compliance. Thus, the summary judgment was reversed in
Horner v. Kentucky High School Athletics Association.7
84. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938 (1995). Plaintiffs
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim also failed. Id. at 273.
85. Id. at 270. See, Charles Beveridge, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletics: When Schools Cut Men's Athletic Teams, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 809 (1996);
Stephen Ross, Karol Kahrs, and Fred Heinrich, Rededication Panel Discussion on
Gender Equity and Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 133 (1995)
(Associate Athletic Director Kahrs of the University of Illinois states that it would
cost $4-5 million to bring the university into full compliance with Title IX).
86. Homer v. Ky. High School Athletic Ass'n., 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994). The
plaintiffs also raised an equal protection claim, but the defendants' summary
judgment was upheld on that claim. Id. at 268.
87. Id. at 276, 277. The dissent stated that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove
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The district court in Pederson v. Louisiana State University
found that LSU did not comply with Title IX in January 1996.8"
The suit was initially filed in 1994 by female students requesting
an affirmative injunction ordering LSU to field intercollegiate var-
sity women's fast pitch softball 9 and soccer teams. A second case
was consolidated, and the district court certified a class of those
LSU female students who have sought to participate in varsity
intercollegiate athletics since 1993 but were not allowed as LSU
failed to field teams. All plaintiffs alleged unequal treatment of
female varsity athletes, but the district court stated that the com-
plaint fails to allege that any plaintiff participated in varsity
sports at LSU. Therefore, these plaintiffs lack standing on this
issue. The plaintiffs also alleged that they were ineffectively
accommodated by their inability to participate.9" The district
court found interest and ability to participate in fast pitch
softball.91
Perhaps the most interesting area of the Pederson case, which
found LSU did not comply with Title IX, 92 is the district court's
reluctance to find the "safe harbor" in the first prong of the Policy
Interpretation that the First Circuit in Cohen v. Brown Univer-
sity,93 the Tenth Circuit in Roberts v. Colorado State Board of
Agriculture,9" and the Sixth Circuit in Homer v. Kentucky High
School Athletics Association9 5 found. To use this safe harbor, one
88. Pederson v. Louisiana State University, 912 F. Supp. 892 (D. LA. 1996).
According to the district court, the violations were not intentional, but rather the
result of "arrogant ignorance," confusion regarding the law, and a remarkably
outdated view of women and athletics. Id. at 913.
89. Women's fast pitch softball was added in 1979 but dropped in 1983. In 1993,
two women's teams, fast pitch softball and soccer, were to be added in 1995, but have
yet to be fully implemented. Id. at 901.
90. Trial on the merits on this issue was held in October 1995. Id. at 900.
91. Id. at 915-916. The court noted that the existence of one or two students
with interest and ability would probably not be sufficient, but the plaintiffs in the
consolidated case were able to show sufficient interests and abilities on campus to
field a varsity women's fast pitch softball team. The original plaintiffs' did not have
standing, so their claims were dismissed with prejudice. Id. at 908.
92. Id. at 913. The district court found that LSU presented no credible evidence
to establish interests and abilities of its student body; LSU has been "ignorant of the
interests and abilities of its student population." The district court, at note 61, set
forth numerous ways that LSU or any institution could be added or elevated:
participation in club or intramural sports, interviews, or questionnaires. LSU also
failed to demonstrate a history and practice of expanding women's athletics under the
second prong.
93. 991 F. 2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
94. 998 F. 2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1994). See infra
notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
95. 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994). See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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must assume that interest and ability to participate in sports
exists between all men and women on all campuses, according to
the district court in Pederson, and the district court found no evi-
dence of this. 6
In summary, the circuit court of appeals decisions leading up
to Cohen v. Brown University9 7 upheld Title IX's regulatory
scheme. Only a district court decision in Pederson v. Louisiana
State University,98 while finding a Title IX violation, did not follow
the regulatory interpretation of Title IX.
COHEN V. BROWN UNIVERSITY
In May 1991, Brown University reduced four teams, two
men's and two women's teams, from varsity to intercollegiate club
status.99 Prior to this, Brown had thirty-one varsity teams, six-
teen men's and fifteen women's. Before the cuts, 63% of varsity
student athletes were men and 37% were women; 52% of the
undergraduate students were male, while 48% were female. 00
After the cuts, the participation rates remained essentially the
same.
Brown, like many universities, faced budget cuts. As a result,
it proposed to cut funding for four varsity sports: women's volley-
ball, women's gymnastics, men's water polo, and men's golf.
These teams were still able to participate in intercollegiate compe-
tition if they would raise the funds on their own. These cuts
would have saved Brown $77,800 per year; however, 80% of the
budget cuts came from the women's teams. 101
The plaintiffs are student members of the women's gymnas-
tics and volleyball teams. They initiated a class action in Cohen I
and charged Brown with discriminating against women in their
intercollegiate athletics program, violating Title IXYo 2 Plaintiffs
asserted that since Brown receives federal financial assistance,
96. 912 F. Supp. 892 (D. LA. 1996).
97. 101 F. 3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
98. 912 F. Supp. 892 (D. LA. 1996). See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying
text.
99. Cohen v. Brown University, 809 F. Supp. 978, 979 (D.R.I. 1992) (Cohen I).
100. Id. at 981.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 979. The class consisted of all present and future Brown University
women students and potential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or
are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown.
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their athletic program is subject to Title IX. 10 3 Pursuant to Title
IX, plaintiffs allege that Brown's actions of demoting the women's
teams exacerbated its discriminatory treatment of women, and
failed to provide women with equal opportunities to compete, and
to effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of one sex.
104
Plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction to restore the
two women's teams to full varsity status. Fourteen days of testi-
mony was heard, including twenty witnesses. At the time of
Cohen I in 1992, the district court judge stated that these were
novel issues and that there was virtually no case law on point. 105
Plaintiffs cited only the lower court decisions in Cook v. Colgate
University °6 and Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania,1 7
as these were the only cases on point at that time.
Plaintiffs allege that Brown met none of the prongs of the Pol-
icy Interpretation's three-part test.0 8 Under the first prong, at no
time has the percentage of women participating in intercollegiate
athletics been substantially proportionate to the percentage of
women undergraduate students at Brown. 10 9 Under the second
prong, all of the women's sports except one were added between
1971, when Pembroke College merged with Brown University,
and 1977. In 1982, winter track was added, and in 1994, after
Cohen I, another women's sport was included. Notably, a request
to elevate women's fencing to varsity status was denied two times.
Thus, the plaintiffs allege that the second prong is not met either.
Plaintiffs also contend that Brown fails the third prong-effective
accommodation of interests and abilities."10
In their defense, Brown asserted that the plaintiffs' interpre-
tation of Title IX is too simplistic and that the statute, the imple-
menting athletic regulations, and the Policy Interpretation must
103. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994). See supra note 7. Brown acknowledged that it
receives federal assistance, but neither admits or denies that its athletic program is
covered by Title IX. Cohen I at 982.
104. Cohen I at 980, 985.
105. Cohen I at 980.
106. 802 F.Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying
text.
107. 812 F.Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993). See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying
text. The judge in Cohen I stated that the facts in Favia were striking similar to the
facts in Cohen I. Cohen I at 986.
108. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
109. Cohen I at 985. The district court noted that this analysis assumes that
participation rates accurately reflect opportunities. This is the same assumption that
the district court judge in 1996 noted in Pederson v. Louisiana State University. See
supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
110. Cohen I at 985-87.
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be read as a whole. For example, all ten factors under the imple-
menting regulation must be considered, not just equal opportu-
nity.11' Brown asserted that opportunity, not participation, is the
crucial factor for compliance, since the statute itself precludes
preferential treatment to members of one sex." 2 Brown's second
argument is that it is effectively accommodating the interests and
abilities of its students. For example, Brown offers one of the
highest number of men's and women's teams at the NCAA and Ivy
League level."13 Any disparities are not discriminatory, but
rather, merely reflect varying interests and abilities. Finally,
Brown alleges that the change in status is not legally significant
as it affects more men than women." 4
The district court stated at the outset that there are no simple
tests to apply. The judge also recognized that the Policy Interpre-
tation and the OCR Athletics Investigator's Manual do not carry
the force of law or establish controlling standards, but the former,
and to a lesser extent the latter, are important guides, and the
dispute to a large extent revolves around differing interpretations
of the documents. "1
5
The court initially had to determine whether a Title IX viola-
tion may be based upon the first of the ten components of the ath-
letic regulation, or whether the analysis was program-wide as the
defendants contend. The court stated that while the language is
not conclusive, a violation of Title IX may be found under the first
policy component only; to wit: effective accommodation. 1 6 The
court then applied the two parts of the test for this area, the three-
prong test, and the two-prong test for levels of competition, and
found that the plaintiffs were substantially likely to prevail on the
111. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (1994). See supra note 11. According to Brown, Title IX
does not require strict proportionality, nor is it an affirmative action statute. Cohen I
at 987.
113. Cohen I at 988. Brown's athletic director claimed in 1995 that Brown was
indisputably among the nation's half-dozen best universities for women's sports, and
ranks in the top one percent of all intercollegiate programs in terms of women's
participation. Marvin Lazerson and Ursula Wagemer, Missed Opportunities: Lessons
from the Title IX Case at Browns, 28 CHANGE 46, 47 (1996).
114. Cohen I at 988.
115. Id. Due to the scarcity of case law at the time of Cohen I, both parties rely
on both documents.
116. Cohen I at 989. The Manual itself states that an investigation may be
limited to less than all three areas of the regulation. Also, not every institution may
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merits.117 Since there was a strong likelihood of irreparable
harm,11 the public interest is served by the court granting injunc-
tive relief to restore women's gymnastics and volleyball to their
prior fully-funded varsity status 9 as well as to prohibit the elimi-
nation or reduction of any existing women's varsity team. If a
violation of Title IX is found at the trial on the merits, the court
would leave it up to Brown to devise a plan consistent with Title
IX. 120
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the
court in Cohen H held that the trial judge did not abuse discretion
by issuing the injunction in this "watershed case."12 ' The circuit
court stated that equal opportunity to participate lies at the core
of Title IX's purpose and agreed that this area of the regulation
may be violated even if the other areas are met. Brown's view is
wrong as a matter of law and public policy, as the Policy Interpre-
tation draws its essence from the statute, and according to the
court, the test as a whole is reasonably construed to implement
the statute. 22 The injunction was proper as plaintiffs have a like-
lihood of success, 123 there is a potential for irreparable harm and
117. Cohen I at 995-997. The operating expenses for women's sports at Brown
were 29% of the operating budget. Women's sports received 22% of recruiting money,
and received 28% of coaches salaries. There was testimony that women's field hockey
did not have enough uniforms while men's ice hockey got new uniforms every year or
two; women's gymnastics didn't even have a sufficient budget to provide a leotard for
each competitor. Locker rooms and publicity were not equivalent. Four men's teams
had a total of eleven courtesy cars, and as of 1990, no women's team had a car,
although one has been added subsequently. Id. at 995-97.
118. The area of irreparable harm included recruiting, competition, and staffing.
Id. at 997-98.
119. This includes: funding the two teams at the 1990-91 level; providing
coaching staff, uniforms, equipment, facilities, publicity, travel and other incidentals;
and providing an on-campus office and support for the coaches. Id. at 1001.
120. Id.
121. 991 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir. 1995) (Cohen II). At the time of Cohen II, the
appeals courts had not yet ruled in Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., see supra notes
67-72 and accompanying text, and Cook v. Colgate Univ., see supra notes 61-64 and
accompanying text.
122. Cohen II at 899-900. Brown is also incorrect, according to the court, in
arguing that the test violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause, citing
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). The court stated that
Congress has broad powers under the Fifth Amendment to remedy past
discrimination. Nor is the injunction affirmative action as argued by Brown, as the
federal judiciary has power to grant any appropriate remedy pursuant to a federal
statute. Cohen II at 901.
123. The district court, according to the circuit court, paid meticulous attention
to this point. Under the first prong of the three-part test, Brown did not closely
approach proportionality. While many universities struggle to meet this prong,
Washington State had success in this area when so ordered by a court. Blair v.
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balancing the harms, and it is in the public interest to grant
injunctive relief to enforce Title JIX.
124
A thirty day trial on the merits was held in December of 1994;
during the trial the parties reached a settlement agreement which
settled the plaintiffs' allegations that significant disparities
existed in the relative financial support of and benefits given to
men's and women's university-funded varsity teams.125 Between
Cohen II and Cohen III, the Third,126 Sixth, 127 Seventh, 128 and
Tenth 29 Circuit courts of appeals rendered Title IX decisions in
accord with the First Circuit's decision in Cohen H.13°
The district court's decision in Cohen III addressed whether
Brown University effectively accommodated the interests and
Washington State Univ., 108 Wash. 2d 558, 740 P.2d 1379 (1987). Brown also did not
meet the second or third prong. Cohen II at 903.
124. Cohen II at 906. "Congress's unmistakably clear mandate that educational
institutions not use federal monies to perpetuate gender-based discrimination," was
the guide for the court. Id. at 907. See, Note, Cohen v. Brown University: A Title IX
Lesson for Colleges and Universities on Gender Equity, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 161, 161
(1994); William Webb, Jr., Case Comment, Sports Law-Cohen v. Brown Univ.: The
Promulgation of Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 351,
351 (1994); R. Lindsay Marshall, Case Comment, Cohen v. Brown Univ.: The First
Circuit Breaks New Ground Regarding Title IX's application to Intercollegiate
Athletics, 28 GA. L. REV. 837, 837 (1994); Mary Beth Petriella, Note, Injunctive Relief
- Title IX - Interim Preliminary Injunction Reinstating Varsity Status to Demoted
Collegiate Athletic Teams is Available When That Team Alleges a Title IX Violation
and Litigation is Pending - Cohen v. Brown, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 595, 595
(1994); William E. Thro and Brian A. Snow, Cohen v. Brown Univ. and the Future of
Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics, 84 ED. LAW. REP. 611, 611 (1975).
125. Cohen v. Brown Univ. 879 F.Supp. 185, 192-93 (D.R.I. 1995). The
settlement agreement covered items 2-10 under the implementing regulation, 34
C.F.R. § 166.41(c) (2-10). See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
126. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993). See supra notes 73-
79 and accompanying text.
127. Homer v. Ky. High School Athletic Ass'n., 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994). See
supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
128. Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 938 (1995). See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
129. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agriculture, 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993). See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
130. Cohen III at 188. See Generally, Jennifer Herderan, Gender Equity in
Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commitment to Fairness, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
133 (1995); Catherine Pieronek, Note, A Clash of Titans: College Football v. Title IX,
20 J. COL. and UNIV. L. 351 (1994); Jill Johnson, Note, Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretation of the Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 553 (1994); Diana Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in
Intercollegiate Athletics During 1992-93: Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard,
1994 DET. C.L. REV. 953 (1994): Teresa Miguel, Title IX and Gender Equity in
Intercollegiate Athletics: Case Analyses, Legal Implications, and the Movement
Toward Compliance, 1 SPORTS L.J. 279 (1994); B. Glenn George, Miles to Go and
Promises to Keep: A Case Study in Title IX, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 555 (1995).
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abilities of women students under the athletic regulation and the
Policy Interpretation. 13 1 Pursuant to the district court, in order to
determine compliance with this factor, the subject of the lawsuit
requires application of the three-prong test. 132
The first prong of the test is substantial proportionality. To
this end, during the latter part of 1993-94, the last complete sea-
son before Cohen III, women made up 38% of varsity athletes, a
13% disparity between athletic participation rates and female stu-
dent enrollment. This "safe harbor" allows for the possibility of
minor fluctuations in participation rates, 33 but the gender bal-
ance was far from substantially proportionate to student
enrollment.
1 3 4
The second prong of the test deals with the history and con-
tinuing practice of program expansion. In this regard, while
Brown University has a history of program expansion, it does not
have a continuing practice of intercollegiate athletic program
expansion for women, the underrepresented sex. 135 The third and
final prong examines the full and effective accommodation of the
underrepresented sex. The district court found that Brown failed
to comply with this prong in two respects. First, Brown has failed
to elevate a team with interest and ability from club to varsity
131. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F.Supp. 185, 199 (D.R.I. 1995) (Cohen III). The
district court first stated that it was not bound by factual determinations in Cohen I
and II, but was bound by legal determinations of the First Circuit in Cohen II. This
second point, raised by the defense, was merely academic, as the district court was in
accord with the First Circuit. Id. at 193-94.
132. The district court further stated that it must abide by the Policy
Interpretation unless it was clearly erroneous or inconsistent with the implementing
regulation. The Policy Interpretation is not a rule or regulation, but rather a
guideline to interpret a regulation. Id. at 199. The defense was incorrect in arguing
that the Policy Interpretation contravenes the intent of Title IX, according to the
court in Cohen III; the three-prong test does not mandate statistical balancing, as
there are two other prongs which may be complied with. Id.
133. The First Circuit in Cohen II did not define participation opportunities, so
the district court in Cohen III defined it as participation rates. Cohen III at 203.
134. Cohen III at 211. Defendants made numerous arguments concerning prong
one. Defendants attempted to apply Title VII employment law. Under Title VII, the
relevant population is the "qualified applicant pool," so under Title IX, according to
Brown, the relevant population should consist only of those men and women who
might be both interested and able to participate in varsity athletics. The district
court disagreed, rejecting defendants' alternative interpretation of prong one. The
court stated that each of the potential survey pools were inappropriate. The pool of
matriculated students is not broad enough. The pool of actual Brown applicants is
also inappropriate, because applicants interested in a sport not offered at Brown may
not apply. Academically able potential varsity participants is also not the appropriate
pool, according to the district court; athletic participants are to be measured. Cohen
III at 201-207.
135. Cohen III at 211.
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status. 136 The second basis for a violation under the third prong is
a new application which arises because Brown has two tiers of
varsity sports: university-funded and donor-funded. This viola-
tion arises because the district court found that Brown maintains
two women's sports at the donor-funded level, which keeps women
from reaching their full athletic potential, when they have the
interest and ability to operate as a university-funded varsity
team.137 This tiered athletic program structure cannot be used to
shield the university from liability for not effectively accommodat-
ing the women athletes on donor-funded teams.1
31
Finding Brown University in violation of Title IX, the district
court has the authority to mandate specific relief.1 39 The court
stated that Title IX does not require an institution to provide any
athletic opportunities to its students. However, if the institution
does in fact provide opportunities, it must provide them equally.
The judge reiterated that the court had no desire to micro-manage
Brown's athletic program, declaring that the situation warranted
judicial restraint. Brown was ordered to submit a comprehensive
plan for complying with Title IX. The court held that there were
several ways to achieve compliance: eliminate the athletic pro-
gram altogether; elevate or create women's positions; demote or
reduce men's programs; or a combination. The preliminary
injunction would remain in effect in the meantime.
140
Brown submitted a plan to the district court which was
rejected as not being comprehensive and not complying with
136. Women's water polo could have been elevated from club to varsity status,
and women's gymnastics, although technically a donor-funded varsity sport, will
cease to exist without university funding. Cohen III at 212.
137. Cohen III at 212-13. Brown argued that it could accommodate less than all
of the interested and able women if, on a proportionate basis, it accommodates less
than all of the interested and able men. The district court found this argument to be
inconsistent with the law, poor policy, and a logistical quagmire. Id. at 200. This
would make it more difficult to ensure that institutions have complied with Title IX,
as more assessments and surveys would need to be done, an insurmountable task. Id.
at 209-210.
138. Cohen III at 213. This also gives rise to additional grounds for a Title IX
violation: the equal treatment factors under the regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(2) -
(10). See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Far more male athletes at Brown are
supported at the university-funded level than are female athletes, and there are
qualitative differences between the two levels. Donor-funded teams are not provided
with equivalent treatment in at least the following program components: equipment
and supplies; travel and per diem; opportunity to receive coaching; assignment and
compensation of coaches; and training services.
139. Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 213 (Cohen III) (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Co.
Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)). See supra note 62.
140. Id. at 214.
1997]
26
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol14/iss2/2
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
Cohen III. Brown's plan stated that its sole goal was to achieve
proportionality, but to do so, Brown must disregard advantages
expressed of one gender while providing advantages to the other.
Instead, Brown stated that it would prefer to keep its current pro-
gram, and that plan is inconsistent with Brown's proposed philos-
ophy. The plan had numerous provisions, including minimum and
maximum team sizes, and for new university-funded junior var-
sity women's teams. However, no additional discretionary fund
would be used. If this was not sufficient, one of the men's teams
could be eliminated. The district court found this plan to be
fatally flawed for two reasons. First, the plan disregards donor-
funded varsity teams. Second, the plan artificially boosts women's
numbers by adding junior varsity positions. Thus, the district
court found that Brown had not made a good faith effort, and
ordered Brown to elevate and maintain four women's teams at
university-funded varsity status. This was stayed pending
appeal, but the preliminary injunction remained in effect.'
41
On appeal to the First Circuit in Cohen IV, the majority
affirmed; specifically, the court found no error in the district
court's factual findings or in its interpretation and application of
the law in determining that Brown violated Title IX in the opera-
tion of its intercollegiate athletics program. The appeals court,
however, did find error in the district court's award of specific
relief, and remanded to allow Brown to submit a further plan; the
preliminary injunction remained in effect. 142
Brown's appeal consisted of its previous statutory and consti-
tutional claims, plus, due to a Supreme Court decision 143 rendered
between Cohen II and Cohen IV, the First Circuit was free to dis-
regard the prior panel's explication of the law. The First Circuit
disagreed under the doctrine of the "law of the case," where a deci-
141. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 188 (1st Cir. 1996)(Cohen IV).
142. Id. at 187-88, The First Circuit agreed that Brown's plan fell short of a good
faith effort to comply with Title IX. Indeed, "the plan is replete with argumentative
statements more appropriate for an appellate brief." The court of appeals stated that
it is obvious that the plan was addressed to this court. The circuit court's respect for
academic freedom and reluctance to interject itself into the conduct for university
affairs were factors in reaching this conclusion. In addition, two things had changed.
First, the substantive issues have been decided and Brown is no longer an appellant.
Second, the time constraints have been alleviated as an appeal is no longer pending.
143. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995). Brown's argument
that Adarand Controls assumes that Adarand is a contrary intervening authority on
point that undermines the validity of Cohen II, which compels the First Circuit to
depart from the law of the case doctrine, and mandates the appeals court to
reexamine Brown's equal protection claim. The First Circuit disagreed. See infra
note 149 and accompanying text.
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sion on an issue of law made by a court at one stage of a case
becomes binding precedent to be followed in successive stages of
the same litigation except in unusual circumstances." The
exceptions to the "law of the case" are rare: the evidence at a sub-
sequent trial was substantially different; the controlling authority
has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to such
issues; 145 or the prior decision was clearly erroneous and would
work a manifest injustice. The First Circuit concluded that no
such exception applied and that Cohen ITs holding controlled.'4 6
On appeal, Brown argued that the district court's interpreta-
tion and application of the three-prong test was irreconcilable
with the Title IX statute, the regulation, and the Policy Interpre-
tation, and as a result, effectively rendered Title IX as an affirma-
tive action statute.1 47 The First Circuit disagreed; Title IX is not
an affirmative action statute modeled after another anti-discrimi-
nation statute, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.148 Instead,
like other anti-discrimination statutory schemes, Title IX and its
enforcement regime permit, but do not require, affirmative action.
The First Circuit reiterated that the regulation deserved control-
ling weight and that the Policy Interpretation warranted substan-
tial deference. The court held that the three-part test was
consistent with the statute. In any event, Brown's challenge was
foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine.1
49
On appeal, Brown also claimed that the district court erred in
failing to apply Title VII standards. The appeals court disagreed,
144. Cohen, 101 F.3d 167 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cohen IV) (citing 1B JAMES W.
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.404[1l] (2d ed. 1993)).
145. Id. at 168, concluding that the First Circuit has narrowly limited this
exception to Supreme Court opinions, en banc opinions of the First Circuit, statutory
overrulings, or those rare situations where newly emergent non-controlling authority
offers a convincing reason for believing that the earlier panel would change its course.
146. Id. at 169. The appeals court stated that Brown offered "remarkably little"
analysis or authority to support its contention that an exception to the law of the case
applies. In fact, according to the First Circuit, Brown argues as if the prior panel had
not ruled on the law, which it did, and as if the district court's analysis was contrary
to Cohen II, which it was not.
147. True affirmative action cases have historically involved a voluntary
undertaking to render discrimination by means of specific group-based preferences or
numerical goals, and a specific timetable for achieving those goals. Id. at 170, citing
Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
148. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994). Title VI prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race, color, or national origin in institutions receiving federal funds. See, Jeffrey H.
Orleans, An End to the Odyssey: Equal Athletic Opportunities for Women, 3 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y., 131, 136 (1996).
149. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 182-183 (Cohen IV). Brown's approach cannot
withstand scrutiny on legal or policy grounds. Brown's interpretation of the three-
part test, according to the Circuit Court, is a one-part test for strict liability.
19971
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however, stating that athletics, which has some gender-segre-
gated teams, differs from admissions and employment, which are
analyzed under Title VII. 150 Concerning Brown's contention that
the disparity in athletic opportunities results from a gender-based
differential in the level of interest in sports, the court stated that
interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; rather, they are a
function of opportunity and experience.
151
Brown's equal protection challenge to the Title IX statutory
scheme was also rejected by the court of appeals, 152 despite the
intervening Supreme Court decision in Adarand. 1 5  The First
Circuit stated that Adarand was limited to race-based classifica-
tions under legislative affirmative action schemes; Adarand does
not even discuss gender discrimination. 5
Brown also claimed that the district court erred in excluding
evidence of relative athletic interests. The Court of Appeals, how-
ever, stated that the evidence was before the trier of fact through
expert testimony, and therefore any error was harmless.
1 5 5
The majority of the First Circuit concluded that there can be
no doubt that Title IX has changed women's sports, as well as soci-
ety's interest in and society's attitude toward women athletes and
women's sports. The impressive performances of the United
States women's athletes in the 1996 Olympic Games was cited as
an example of how Title IX had a dramatic and positive impact on
the capabilities of women athletes.
156
The dissent in Cohen IV differed from the majority on several
issues. 157 First, under the 'law of the case," the intervening
Supreme Court decision of Adarand5 5 is irreconcilable with
150. Cohen IV., at 177.
151. Id.at 179. Brown's argument was viewed by the court "with great
suspicion", and was deemed "of no consequence." Id. at 178-9. This argument ignores
the fact that Title IX was enacted in order to remedy discrimination resulting from
stereotyped nations of women's interests and abilities. The tremendous growth in
women's participation in sports since Title IX disproves Brown's argument that
women are less interested in sports, according to the court in Cohen IV. Id. at 180.
152. See supra note 118 on Brown's equal protection claim in Cohen II.
153. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995).
154. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 183 (Cohen IV). Brown's equal protection challenge
rests upon at least two erroneous assumptions, according to the court. First, Adarand
is controlling authority that compels the court to apply strict scrutiny. Second, the
application of the law by the district court in Cohen III is inconsistent with Cohen II.
Therefore, Brown's equal protection claim again failed.
155. Id. at 185.
156. Id. at 188. The athletes themselves have acknowledged the beneficial effect
that Title IX has had on women's sports.
157. Id. at 188 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
158. 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995) See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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Cohen II and must be followed in Cohen IV. At the time of Cohen
II, the standard intermediate scrutiny test for discriminatory clas-
sification based on sex required that a statutory classification be
substantially related to an important government objective.
Under intermediate scrutiny before Adarand, courts sometimes
allowed benign gender classifications as a reasonable means of
compensating women as a class for past discrimination.' 59 This
was done under the 1990 Supreme Court decision of Metro Broad-
casting, Incorporated v. FCC 60 , a case based upon racial classifi-
cations. Metro Broadcasting, however, has been overruled, at
least in part, by Adarand, according to the dissent in Cohen IV.
1 61
The Supreme Court in Adarand held that all racial classifications
must be analyzed under strict scrutiny, as it may not always be
clear that a preference is benign. Thus, the dissent argued that
the court in Cohen IV should follow Adarand,1 2 subjecting all
gender-conscious government action to the same inquiry.
A second 1996 Supreme Court decision, United States v. Vir-
163ginia, also required the First Circuit to review its decision in
Cohen If according to the dissent in Cohen IV. In Virginia, a gen-
der-based case, the Supreme Court applied a more searching
"skeptical scrutiny" standard, instead of the traditional test that
gender classifications be "substantially related" to an important
government objective.' 64 Therefore, because Adarand and Vir-
ginia, were not followed, the dissent argued that Cohen I was
flawed.
The binding authority of Cohen If is also lessened because it
is only an appeal from a preliminary injunction, which examines
probable outcomes, rather than the ultimate law of the case.
Thus, according to the dissent in Cohen IV, the First Circuit must
review the findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard and
the findings of law de novo.' 65
159. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 901 (Cohen II).
160. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
161. Cohen, 101 F.3d at 189-90, (Cohen IV)(Torruella, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 190. Absent a judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-
based measures, there is simply no way of determining which classifications are
benign and which classifications are, in fact, motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple rational politics. Adarand, 115 S.Ct. at 2112-3.
163. 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). In this case, the Supreme Court held that the
Virginia Military Institute, a state-sponsored all-male institution, must admit
women.
164. Id. at 2274.
165. Cohen IV at 192.
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Reviewing the district court's construction of the three-prong
test, the dissent in Cohen IV states that the interpretation by the
district court of prongs one and three creates an Equal Protection
problem. 166 First, the district court's interpretation constitutes an
affirmative action, quota based scheme. Second, even assuming
that the quota scheme is otherwise constitutional, there is no
"exceedingly persuasive justification" of the scheme under
Virginia.
167
Under the first prong, due to the regulation on contact sports,
the dissent would remove contact sports16 8 from the calculation of
participation ratios. 169  These contact sports field very large
teams, and by removing these numbers, Brown might be in com-
pliance. The district court's interpretation of the second prong,
according to the dissent, implies that an institution must not only
demonstrate that the proportion of women in their program is
growing over time, but it must also show that the absolute
number of female participants is increasing. A school facing budg-
etary cuts must still increase women's opportunities, even if it
cannot afford to do so. The dissent stated that the purpose of the
regulations is to protest against discrimination, not increase ath-
letics. It is not for the courts or the legislature to mandate pro-
grams of a given size. The third prong, according to the dissent, is
subject to at least two interpretations. To fully accommodate the
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex under the dis-
trict court's definition is an extraordinarily high, perhaps impossi-
bly high, standard. The dissent agrees with Brown's
interpretation, that the institution must meet the under-
represented sex's unmet reasonable interest and ability as fully as
it meets those of the overrepresented sex.1
7 0
166. Id. at 197.
167. Virginia at 2274.
168. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b ) (1994). See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying
text.
169. Cohen at 192 (Cohen IV). This assumes that participation rates are a
reasonable measure of participation opportunities, which the dissent also does not
agree with.
170. Cohen IV at 194. In addition, 20 U.S.C. §1681 (1994), see supra note 7-13,
casts doubt on the district court's interpretation of the third prong, as the statute
contains language that prohibits the ordering of preferential treatment on the basis of
sex. Reviewing the three prong test, the first prong mandates statistical balancing.
The second prong requires the institution to show that it is moving in the direction of
the first prong, and thus also requires balancing. The third prong dispenses with
statistical balancing only because it accords zero weight to one side of the balance.
This goes farther than the quota of the first prong and requires complete
accommodation of the underrepresented sex, according to the dissent. Id. at 196.
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The dissent also questioned the majority's refusal to accept
surveys of interest levels as evidence of unmet interest. 7' The
majority, however, offers no guidance to an institution seeking to
assess interest level.
The dissent concluded that Brown is a private institution
with a constitutionally protected First Amendment right to choose
its curriculum, including athletics. Although the First Amend-
ment cannot be used to justify discrimination, the majority
straight-jackets college athletic programs by curtailing their free-
dom to select sports. Virtually every other aspect of college life is
entrusted to the institution except athletics, and the university is
no longer in full control of its programs.' 72
CONCLUSION
Cohen v. Brown University sends a strong message that col-
leges and universities must comply with Title IX's requirements
concerning intercollegiate athletics. 73 Courts of appeals have
consistently applied and upheld Title IX's regulatory regime in
intercollegiate athletics. 74  Numerous settlements, including
those at the University of Oklahoma, Temple University, William
and Mary College, the University of Bridgeport (Connecticut),
Amherst, the University of New Hampshire, the University of Cal-
ifornia System, 75 the University of Texas at Austin,
76 Cornell, 1 77
171. Id. at 197. Brown was not allowed to introduce the NCAA Gender Equity
Study and the results of an undergraduate poll on student interest in athletics. The
majority did not accept this as it might just reflect the result of past discrimination.
See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
172. Id. at 198.
173. No. 95-2205 (1st Cir. Nov. 21, 1996) (Cohen IV). See supra notes 139-169
and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 60. At the time of this article, however, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has not ruled in Pederson v. Louisiana State University, 912
F.Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1992). See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text. It is
possible that the Fifth Circuit may take a different approach over to Title IX's
enforcement in intercollegiate athletics as the district court in Pederson did.
175. The university settlements are mentioned in Gail Diane Cox, Brown v.
Ruling Preserves Big Mo in Female Sports, NAT'L. L.J. A20 (1996).
176. Sanders v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, Civil No. A-92-CA-405 (W.D. Tex. Oct.
24, 1993). In settling this Title IX class action suit, the university agreed to raise
women's participation in varsity athletics from 232 to 447 within three years;
women's undergraduate enrollment is 472.
177. Schuck v. Cornell University, Civil No. 93-CV-756 FJ5-GJD (N.D.N.Y. Dec.
8, 1993). The parties settled this suit when Cornell agreed to restore two women's
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Auburn University, 178 and Pennsylvania179 have been favorable to
women. Therefore, athletic departments should review the stat-
ute itself,180 its implementing regulations signed by the Presi-
dent,"8 1 and the Policy Interpretation1 2 and its Clarification,
8 3
which are given deference by courts. This district court judge
noted in Cohen I that the judge was rather surprised at Brown's
apparent indifference towards Title IX. Brown's athletic director
and associate athletic director testified that while they were cogni-
zant of Title IX, they did not review the Title IX statute or imple-
menting regulations when deciding to reduce the four teams.
They both further stated that they had not even heard of the Pol-
icy Interpretation.18 4 Whether an institution or athletic program
agrees with the current interpretation or not,' Title IX's regula-
tory scheme is being strictly enforced by the federal courts of
appeals. Brown University raised numerous challenges to the
current enforcement mechanism for Title IX, and was not
successful.
While universities do not have to sponsor intercollegiate ath-
letics, 8 6 if they do, it is clear after Cohen IV that they must com-
ply with Title IX. To comply, schools may cut men's opportunities,
178. Kiechel v. Auburn University, Civil No. 93-V-474-E (M.D. Ala. July 19,
1993). Auburn settled this class action suit by agreeing to elevate women's soccer
from club to varsity level, by committing $400,000 to the women's varsity team for
operating expenses from 1993-95, by constructing practice and game fields, by
phasing in scholarships, and by paying damages and attorney's fees and expenses.
179. Marvin Lazerson and Ursula Wagener, Missed Opportunities: Lessons
From the Title IX Case at Brown, 28 CHANGE 46 (1996). In addition, in the Ivy
League, although not part of any settlement, Yale, Harvard, Columbia, and
Dartmouth have announced plans to improve the quality of women's sports, and
Princeton has been expanding facilities and opportunities for women. Id. at 50.
180. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. In addition, the 1990 Title
IX Athletic Investigator's Manual put out by the OCR should be reviewed
periodically. See supra note 50. The NCAA has also put out a Guide to Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, written by Valerie Bonnette, the co-author of OCR's
Investigator's Manual. VALERIE BONNETTE, NCAA GUIDE TO TITLE IX AND
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS (1994).
184. Cohen I at 1,000 n. 221. The court further stated that no studies had been
done to assess Brown's compliance with Title IX, and apparently none had been done
at Brown since 1979 until the time of the case. There was a Gender Equity Study
done by Brown for the NCAA in 1991. Id. at 981, note 3.
185. Author Camille Paglia calls Title IX a formerly useful statute gone berserk.
Gail Diane Cox, Brown v. Ruling Preserves Big Mo in Female Sports, NAT'L. L. J. A20
(1996).
186. OCR, TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL 10 (1990). No
college or university has elected to eliminate athletics entirely, however. Stephen
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or elevate women's opportunities. Many institutions have cut or
capped men's teams to move towards compliance; since 1982, 99
colleges have eliminated wrestling and 64 have eliminated swim-
ming, and men's gymnastics has dropped from 133 teams to 32
currently.18 7 This author, however, recommends that women's
opportunities be expanded to each compliance.1 8 8 This fulfills the
underlying principle of Title IX-increasing opportunities to
women.
Noncompliance with Title IX after Cohen v. Brown University
is not an advisable option for a university sponsoring intercollegi-
ate athletics, as Brown is considered to be among the top universi-
ties in the nation for women's sports opportunities. 8 9 While some
state that the cost of reaching compliance by increasing women's
opportunities is expensive, the cost of non-compliance may be
more expensive. Brown reportedly spent over half a million' 90 to
one million' 9' litigating the case, even though Brown's major
outside counsel reportedly represented Brown at half his usual
fee,' 92 although this is not confirmed. 93 It would have cost Brown
$62,000 per year to correct the problem when the suit was filed,
Erber, "Proportionality" Will Keep Both Male and Female Athletes Out of the Game,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. 136 (1996).
187. Stephen Erber, "Proportionality" Will Keep Both Male and Female Athletes
Out of the Game, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. 136 (1996).
188. Dr. Lopiano's testimony in Cohen III at 214 states:
I believe that philosophically in any case where you have a previously
disadvantaged population that you're trying to bring up to snuff to the
advantaged population, that it's a bad idea to bring the advantaged
population down to the level of the disadvantaged population. [Tihe
whole idea [of Title IX] is to add participation opportunities for women.
And it's unfortunate that across the country that in the name of
maintaining the standard of living of football team[s] or the standard of
living of one or two special men's sports, that men's sports are being cut
and women's gender equity under Title IX [is] being blamed for that.
189. See supra note 109. This district court in Cohen III notes, however, that
other universities more clearly violate Title IX, and it does not exonerate an
institution that provides unequal opportunities for men and women. Cohen III at
189, n. 5.
190. Donna Lopiano, Title IX: It's Time To Live Up to the Letter of the Law,
CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. 37 (1996). Lopiano states that the Brown lawsuit
began after Brown spent $250,000 to buy out the football coach's contract.
191. Gail Diane Cox, Brown v. Ruling Preserves Big Mo in Female Sports,
NAT'L. L. J. A20 (1996).
192. Marvin Lazerson and Ursula Wagener, Missed Opportunities: Lessons
From the Title IX Case at Brown, 28 CHANGE 46, 48-9 (1996).
193. Attorney Walter Connelly declines to discuss fees. Gail Diane Cox, Brown
v. Ruling Preserves Big Mo in Female Sports, NAT'L. L. J. A20 (1996).
1997]
34
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 2
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol14/iss2/2
ENTERTAINMENT & SPORTS LAW REVIEW
according to the plaintiffs' attorney.19 4 Also, universities would
normally prefer to develop a plan to bring the university into com-
pliance rather than be under court order to do.
Finally, universities with football programs are usually out of
compliance, at least under the first prong of the Policy Interpreta-
tion of proportionality.' 95 A partial solution to this problem,
although it may not be popular, is for the NCAA to take an active
role to help institutions by reducing the maximum football squad
size to help with proportionality. The dissent in Cohen IV stated
that contact sports could be reduced from the equation for propor-
tionality,'96 although the majority disagreed. The NCAA or con-
ferences could reduce men's squad sizes and grants-in-aid for
football and other large squad size contact sports to make reach-
ing compliance easier for athletic programs.
1 97
194. This is according to plaintiffs' attorney Arthur Bryant. Id. Instead,
according to Bryant, Brown has spent a million dollars upgrading women's teams, on
top of attorneys' fees. The vice-president for university relations at Brown states that
the university is now in compliance, as 48% of athletes are female, as compared to
52% of the student body. Jim Naughton, Appeals Court Confirms Ruling That Brown
v. Discriminated Against Female Athletes, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. A41
(1996).
195. Jim Naughton, Higher Education Weighs the Impact of a Ruling on Gender
Equity in Sports, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED. A57 (1996).
196. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
197. For example, in a cost-cutting move, the Big Sky Conference cut each




Mota: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics--The First Circuit Holds B
Published by Institutional Repository, 1997
